











Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 December 2013




Edward Vickers, « Editorial », China Perspectives [Online], 2013/4 | 2013, Online since 01 December
2013, connection on 24 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/
6312  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6312 
© All rights reserved
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 3
China p e r s p e c t i v e sSpecial feature
Editorial
EDWARD VICKERS
Aresurgent China nowadays looms ever larger in the public conscious-ness of its East Asian neighbours, with implications not just for theirexternal relationships, but also for their domestic political dynamics.
However, Japan still supplies, as it has for over a century, the benchmark of
successful “catch-up” modernisation for states, including China, that see
themselves as still “catching up.” For authoritarian governments keen to
minimise “spiritual pollution,” Japan has also long provided a model for the
selective preservation of native “essence” alongside imported modern “tech-
nology,” even while attracting condemnation for the nationalistic excesses
associated with this enterprise: colonialism, invasion, and associated bru-
tality. And at the popular level, the impact of Japanese culture – high-brow,
low-brow, literary, or visual – on the societies of the region has been man-
ifold and profound.
With the exception of Korea, no country’s modern history has been more
intimately intertwined with Japan than China’s. Even at the height of the
Cold War, Japan re-emerged under American tutelage as the key regional
trading partner for Hong Kong and for “Free China” on Taiwan. And when
bilateral ties with the mainland were restored in the 1970s, exhortations to
look eastwards for lessons in modernisation came from Deng Xiaoping, the
child of an era when Chinese intellectual life was still dominated by Japan-
educated scholars. (1) Not just in commerce and industry, but in almost every
sphere of social and cultural life, the engagement of post-Reform China with
Japan has been far-reaching – more so, sometimes, than it has officially
been deemed politic to acknowledge. Yet the early twenty-first century pres-
ents us with the spectacle of a Chinese society apparently more animated
by anti-Japanese fervour than at any time since the 1940s. Why is this so?
While official programmes of “patriotic education” have played a role, in
a post-Mao China characterised by significant, if limited, media plurality,
state propaganda is neither all-encompassing nor consistent enough to offer
a more than partial explanation. We need to ask why certain messages strike
a popular chord. A contrast is commonly drawn between an allegedly con-
ciliatory approach under Deng Xiaoping and the turn to nationalism under
his successors, with the latter blamed for provoking hostility amongst the
population at large. However, one advocate of this line claims that “to tell
passionate Chinese patriots [in the early Reform period] that they should
learn from the Japanese took political courage and determination,” (2) ac-
knowledging the already-existing reservoir of popular antipathy towards
Japan (but ignoring Deng’s own manipulations of anti-Japanese senti-
ment). (3) Although the Party leadership may largely have toed a pragmatic
line, the same was not true of university students, who from the mid-1980s
mounted protests against visits by leading politicians to Tokyo’s Yasukuni
Shrine (honouring war dead including convicted war criminals), official cen-
sorship of history textbook accounts of the war, and other perceived Japan-
ese transgressions (see article by Yinan He). (4) In the 1990s, as Party leaders
cast about for a new ideological anchor, anti-foreign, and especially anti-
Japan, nationalism therefore presented itself as a ready alternative to mori-
bund state socialism. Patriotic education has tapped, manipulated, and
doubtless accentuated attitudes already salient among the population at
large – but it has not manufactured an anti-Japan consciousness out of thin
air.
The role of grass-roots activism in sustaining anti-Japan sentiment is es-
pecially obvious in the case of Hong Kong. (5) It was the former British colony
(along with Taiwan), not the propaganda-drenched but politically-repressed
mainland, that in the early 1970s spawned a popular movement to “protect”
the Diaoyu Islands, at around the time these disputed rocks were being
transferred (along with Okinawa) from American back to Japanese control
– and as the People’s Republic was engaged in “normalising” its diplomatic
ties with Tokyo. Indeed, some of the most ardent exponents of anti-Japan
patriotism have been among the fiercest critics of the local and Beijing au-
thorities. There is a connection here between popular and official discourse:
a regime that stakes its legitimacy on anti-foreign nationalism, as to some
extent China’s Communists have always done (even if economic growth
nowadays takes priority), is vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy when striking
deals with the old enemy. But the outrage of anti-Japan agitators has often
appeared visceral, not just tactical.
As Yinan He notes in the current special feature, the strength of this anti-
Japanese sentiment cannot be explained without some consideration of
Japanese agency. Japanese complaints about the Chinese state’s deliberate
fanning of hostile sentiment are nothing new. In the 1920s, against a back-
drop of escalating Japanese incursions into China, diplomats (including post-
war Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru) lamented the impact of xenophobic
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propaganda on impressionable Chinese youth. (6) Just as such protestations
were breathtakingly disingenuous then, so they are today, when the political
heirs of early-Showa imperialists honour their forebears in pseudo-religious
ceremonies (at Yasukuni), while denying past atrocities and preaching their
nation’s quintessential victimhood. Japan now is very different from the mil-
itarist power of 80 years ago, not least in its profound commitment to
peace; but collective failure frankly to confront the wartime past supplies
plentiful grist to the Chinese nationalist mill.
Nonetheless, Chinese are by no means universally or uniformly in the grip
of anti-Japan resentment. Chinese demand for Japanese goods and services
appears relatively resilient, despite the negative wider repercussions of re-
cent bilateral tensions (see Stephen Robert Nagy’s article in the current
issue). Meanwhile, beyond the sphere of commerce, the allure of Japanese
modernity remains strong, as witnessed by the recent success of a glossy
new magazine, It is Japan (Zhi Ri 知日), catering specifically to youthful afi-
cionados of “Japanese culture, art, creativity, and tourism.” (7) This suggests
class as well as generational dimensions: opportunities to enjoy these things
are available primarily to wealthy, highly educated elites. For well-heeled
cosmopolitan urbanites in Shanghai or Beijing, the dreary catechism of anti-
foreign nationalism must seem banal and embarrassing (history and politics
are notably absent from the It is Japan prospectus). (8) At the same time, the
virulence of anti-Japan protest may derive from resentment not just of
Japan or its governing elites, but of privileged Chinese for whom Japanese
luxury is within reach. (9)
In examining contemporary Chinese perspectives on Japan, it is thus hard
to know where to start. We begin by defining “Chinese” in geographically
broad terms, encompassing societies beyond the mainland People’s Republic
(PRC), namely Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as (for comparative purposes)
the ethnically and culturally “Chinese” city-state of Singapore. In addition
to sharing distinctively “Chinese” cultural attributes, all these societies ex-
perienced Japanese occupation during the first half of the twentieth century,
albeit to differing extents and in significantly different ways: 50 years of de-
velopmentalist colonialism in Taiwan, short-lived but brutal occupation in
Hong Kong and Singapore, and steady encroachment followed by the pro-
longed agony of war on the Chinese mainland. In addition, during the post-
war period all have developed intimate commercial and cultural ties with
Japan. As we shall see, however, the past casts pronounced if varied shadows
over each, and the old enemy has come to occupy quite different positions
in their national narratives. (10)
With respect to subject matter as well as location, other starting points
might have been possible, but our focus in this special feature falls pri-
marily on official discourse. The “visions” of Japan with which we concern
ourselves are primarily those generated by the educational or cultural
bureaucracy, manifested in school textbooks and museums, though we
also look at the wider context of bilateral relations (mainly from the “of-
ficial” vantage point of high politics or diplomacy), and at the way in
which tensions (inter-governmental and popular) have affected Sino-
Japanese commerce. Yinan He provides an overview of the history of re-
lations between the PRC and Japan since diplomatic normalisation,
highlighting major shifts and analysing some of the factors behind these.
Edward Vickers compares the treatment of Japan in two major new or
refurbished historical museums on either side of the Taiwan Strait, show-
ing how depictions of Japan illustrate divergent narratives of nationhood.
Edward Vickers and Yang Biao analyse the history textbooks of Shanghai,
which since the early 1990s has enjoyed the right to devise its own
school curriculum; the shifting portrayal of Japan, they argue, highlights
tensions inherent in allowing the city to carve a distinctive role as China’s
most “advanced” and cosmopolitan metropolis, while still requiring fi-
delity to an orthodox national narrative conceived in Beijing. Christine
Han examines how school history textbooks in two former British
colonies, Singapore and Hong Kong, have dealt with largely similar ex-
periences of invasion and occupation by Japan, and discusses how their
different narratives reflect radically distinct nation-building projects. Fi-
nally, Stephen Robert Nagy considers the implications for trade and com-
merce of the recent spike in Sino-Japanese tensions. 
Since our focus here falls especially on officially sanctioned historical nar-
ratives, the question arises: Why do these matter? Especially in an age when
young people garner more and more information from the Internet, what
significance do school textbooks and state-run museums retain? 
School texts and museums matter not just in themselves – as instruments
for directly shaping the consciousness of the young – but also as definitive
statements of an orthodox historical narrative. In a society such as the PRC,
they play a significant role in signalling to educators and others where the
parameters of ideological correctness lie. Even if not consciously inter-
nalised, orthodoxy must be publicly performed by those anxious to avoid
antagonising the authorities. Artists, intellectuals, and academics can be re-
lied upon to challenge and test the boundaries of orthodoxy, even on the
Chinese mainland (where this still involves personal and professional risk),
but will struggle (especially on the mainland) significantly to influence mass
consciousness unless they can effect a revision of the authorised narrative
as conveyed through official media. Even where conventional and online
media are relatively untrammelled, the pronouncements of individual blog-
gers, journalists, or academics lack the authoritative stamp and broad read-
ership of an officially approved textbook. No other media can claim a
similarly captive audience, or rely on an elaborate assessment apparatus to
ensure that content is studied, memorised, and reproduced on demand. It
is thus natural that across East Asia, where the production of school text-
books is everywhere strictly supervised by the state, the contents of history
teaching materials attract unrelenting critical scrutiny, not least from the
tireless denizens of cyberspace. (11)
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Nevertheless, the fact that textbooks are as (or perhaps more) likely
to attract criticism for being insufficiently nationalistic as for being
overly so brings us back to the issue of the extent to which today’s wide-
spread anti-Japanese sentiment can be seen the outcome of an orches-
trated programme of political socialisation. The term “brainwashing” has
recently enjoyed popularity with Japanese right-wingers keen to dismiss
anti-Japan protests as products of Communist thought control and Chi-
nese political “immaturity.” (12) It has also been deployed, with appar-
ently unconscious irony, by mainland officials lambasting Hong Kongers
protesting against the introduction of “Moral and National Educa-
tion”; (13) the latter, they claim, are the stooges of “Western imperialism,”
“brainwashed” by decades of British colonial education. But even in so
far as popular attitudes can be attributed to official programmes of po-
litical socialisation, the question remains: what makes people receptive
to certain types of political socialisation, but not to others? (14)
Here it is salutary to recall that Taiwan was subjected for 40 years to a
concerted Kuomintang (KMT) campaign of political re-socialisation, aimed
at transforming the island’s inhabitants into ardent Chinese patriots infused,
amongst other things, with a proper resentment of Japanese depredations.
However, Taiwanese entered the post-Cold War era arguably more ambiva-
lent about their Chinese identity than in 1945, and in the grip of a popular
“fever” for all things Japanese. Its remoteness from geopolitical reality and
lived experience, as well as the KMT’s own record of oppression, rendered
the official vision of nationhood, and Japan’s place within it, implausible or
unpalatable to many. Viewed through the prism of four decades of Martial
Law, the colonial period assumed a sepia-tinted aura, as an era of rational
modernisation under largely benevolent Japanese trusteeship. This vision
finds distinct echoes in the National Museum of Taiwan History (see Edward
Vickers’ article on museums). Images of Japan have been implicated in an
ongoing – and doubtless never-ending – struggle to redefine an orthodox
vision of the national past, in the context of an increasingly diverse and
complex popular discourse on matters of history and identity.
The portrayal of Japan in official discourse thus cannot be understood
simply as the work of Svengalian apparatchiks. Even in an authoritarian
context such as the mainland PRC, textbook and museum narratives reflect
as well as help to direct popular perceptions and prejudices, as political
elites manoeuvre to reinforce their legitimacy. Agency in shaping these
perceptions is distributed amongst those elites, the media, activist groups,
and the wider public of Chinese societies, as well as to actors within Japan
itself. And as Yinan He observes, even when official bilateral ties are as
fraught as at present, scope remains for people-to-people contacts to fos-
ter relationships drawing on sources besides the poisoned well of wartime
memory. To be sure, social and political divisions within both Japan and
China, as well as geopolitical factors, render this difficult; but these divisions
also underline the diversity of these societies. Officially sanctioned linear
national narratives notwithstanding, there is not one “China” or one
“Japan,” or even one “Taiwan” or “Hong Kong,” but many, just as there are
important dimensions of identity that transcend the nation-state. Even if
school texts continue largely to ignore this, perhaps we can hope that
greater civil society contacts across national boundaries will make it in-
creasingly apparent to those in a position to influence public opinion, in
Japan as well as in China.
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